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Abstract:  
As neuroscientists we want to understand how causal interactions or mechanisms within the brain 
give rise to perception, cognition, and behavior. It is typical to estimate interaction effects from 
measured activity using statistical techniques such as functional connectivity, Granger Causality, 
or information flow, whose outcomes are often falsely treated as revealing mechanistic insight. 
Since these statistical techniques fit models to low-dimensional measurements from brains, they 
ignore the fact that brain activity is high-dimensional. Here we focus on the obvious confound of 
common inputs: the countless unobserved variables likely have more influence than the few 
observed ones. Any given observed correlation can be explained by an infinite set of causal 
models that take into account the unobserved variables. Therefore, correlations within massively 
undersampled measurements tell us little about mechanisms. We argue that these mis-inferences 
of causality from correlation are augmented by an implicit redefinition of words that suggest 
mechanisms, such as connectivity, causality, and flow.  
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The state of the estimated connectivity field 
A fundamental goal in neuroscience is to understand brain mechanisms that underlie perception, 
cognition, and behavior, which, arguably, requires understanding the causal interactions between 
neurons and neuronal populations. Whenever we talk about causal interactions in this opinion 
paper, we use the counterfactual definition. A variable causally influences another variable if a 
perturbation of the first variable would induce a change in the activity of another variable (Pearl, 
2009a). This nicely approximates what we mean as neuroscientists: if we say a neuron influences 
another neuron we mean that perturbing the first (say electrically) would affect the second and if 
we say that a region influences another we mean that perturbing the first region (say magnetically) 
would affect the second. Causality has a perfectly clean definition (counterfactuals or 
perturbation) and we should demand our statistical approaches to be measured against it 
(although see also Gomez-Marin, 2017).  
Because we cannot directly measure these interactions, statistical techniques are used 
that aim to infer interactions from simultaneously recorded brain signals. This often boils down to 
asking the question of how does neural population A mechanistically affect population B? The 
approaches that we call estimated connectivity (eC) in this paper convert measured signals into 
a statistical estimate of “connectivity.” The results are typically (implicitly or explicitly) thought of 
as a measure or at least approximation of the causal strength of interactions. A rich body of 
literature has described eC techniques: some techniques utilize granger causality (Bressler and 
Seth, 2011), other techniques are called functional connectivity and look at delayed correlations 
(Friston et al., 1997). Yet other techniques talk about information flow (Babiloni et al., 2005; Honey 
et al., 2007). Another class more directly talks about Dynamic Causal Modeling (Daunizeau et al., 
2011). Within the imaging community the term effective connectivity (EC) is often used when 
causality is explicitly claimed but within our definition they fall into our more expansive definition 
of eC. We will argue that the used observational approaches share the same logical weakness – 
statistical confounding. Yet, the lure of extracting causality from observational data, is so powerful, 
that we cannot avoid feeling the pull of it and have effectively referred to correlations in 
connectivity terms (Stevenson et al., 2008).  
The problem of unobserved confounding is the existence of unobserved variables that 
affect the observed variables in a way that often makes the estimation of connectivity impossible. 
It is easy to see why it is impossible to use any statistical techniques to estimate causal 
interactions in the presence of unobserved confounding. Let us say there is a causal influence 
from A to B. In this case, it is always possible to construct a common input C which will produce 
the same effect on B that A would have (e.g. by replicating A and feeding into C). Similarly, if 
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there is no influence from A to B it is always possible to use a confounder to change A and B so 
that they now look like they do interact, according to any algorithm used. These issues would 
maybe be a minor problem if we had reasons to believe that confounding is weak, i.e. if there 
were not many orders of magnitude more confounders than measured variables. It is thus logically 
impossible that an algorithm could identify the network of interactions.  
Techniques used for estimating connectivity typically come from fields that focus on 
forecasting or describing time-series. For example, Granger Causality (Bressler and Seth, 2011) 
and Coherence analysis (Bastos and Schoffelen, 2016; Sun et al., 2004) have been developed 
to describe the relationship between signals. They were then translated to address biological 
questions such as “How does neural population A interact with neural population B?” (Bressler 
and Seth, 2011; Friston et al., 2003, 1997). In many cases, scientists simply analyze the 
correlations and take high correlations to be a sign of neuronal communication. Alternatively, 
delayed or nonlinear correlations are used to estimate the direction of interactions. However, in 
biological questions we usually seek causal mechanisms and not just good predictions. Hence, 
researchers increasingly use, without much discussion of threats from confounding, techniques 
that were used to describe the relationships between signals to make claims about causality. 
Indeed, many scientists have been developing techniques for estimating the strength of 
connections between neurons based on simultaneous spike recordings. The underlying idea is 
that we want to predict each neuron’s spiking probability based on the activity of other observed 
neurons (Pillow et al., 2008). And indeed, if we record all neurons, they are noisy, and we know 
that from their transfer function we should be able to estimate the strength and nature of causal 
interactions (Karbasi et al., 2018). There has been ample speculation about the meaning of the 
results of such a study, but it is frequently interpreted in causal terms (Pillow et al., 2008; 
Stevenson et al., 2008).  
Another group of scientists has been developing techniques for estimating the strength of 
interactions between brain areas using neuroimaging techniques such as 
Electroencephalography (EEG), Magnetoencephalography (MEG), and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI). Estimated connectivity (eC) in neuroimaging has been intensively 
studied with data acquired during tasks, as well as rest (resting-state connectivity). Within the eC 
community one can delineate two different philosophies. Some authors use eC to describe 
replicable network properties of functional and anatomical neural data without attributing causal 
significance to interregional correlations (Raichle et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2009; Yeo et al., 2011). 
Others typically interpret changes in parameter estimates in more explicitly causal terms such 
contributing factors of pathophysiological processes (Hacker et al., 2012; Karlsgodt et al., 2008; 
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Pawela et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2009), 
or as neuroplasticity in the functional 
re-organization of the brain in 
neurological or psychiatric conditions 
(Hallam et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2011; 
Lueken et al., 2013).  
In search for a better 
understanding of brain network 
organization in health and disease, 
articles increasingly talk about eC. 
According to our Google Scholar 
search (May 14th 2018) for literature 
published in English language between 2000 and 2017 (excluding patents and citations), over 
15% of articles that included the term “neuroscience“ also mentioned “functional connectivity” 
(Figure 1;  code and data available on: https://osf.io/9cs8p/). FC is a huge area in neuroscience 
making it important to obtain clarity about its interpretation and usefulness for potential future 
translational applications.  
 
It is not just semantics? 
The eC measures have in common that they are functions of (sometimes generalized) 
correlations. However, the language used generally does not reflect that. Almost every term in 
popular use suggests causality. For example, we use terms like Granger Causality, functional 
connectivity, information flow, effective connectivity, dynamic causal models, etc.  We do this 
despite the fact that other terms such as improvement in predictive power, correlations, 
conditional correlations, and model comparison can denote more precisely what we actually do. 
To deal with the disagreement between used correlational techniques and desired mechanistic 
or causal statements, we are effectively redefining the English language. Connectivity implies a 
connection between two places. Causality implies cause and effect. Flow implies that something 
moves from one place to another. Effective implies that something has an effect. This set of re-
definitions gives rise to the problem that eC approaches are often misunderstood.  
Scientists write about connections within the brain minimizing the wiring length along 
which signals need to travel (Bullmore and Bassett, 2011; Bullmore and Sporns, 2009), but while 
the brain may want to minimize the length of its wires, there is no implication that it pays any price 
for correlations. They write about stimulation to control the network (Taylor et al., 2015), which 
 
Figure 1: Functional connectivity is becoming 
extremely popular. The popularity of neuroscience and 
within it the popularity of talking about functional 
connectivity. 
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requires interactions to be causal. They write about interference to cure diseases (Khambhati et 
al., 2016), which again requires causality. Or they write about regions that “cause more exchange 
of causal information” (Bajaj et al., 2015). These examples show how correlations are assumed 
to indicate causality. Specifically, FC is often used as if it did reveal an approximate understanding 
of causality, and much of it is due to misleading use of words that imply causality in lay English 
and merely refer to algorithm properties in statistics. 
For example, we ourselves wrote in 2008  “ […] [estimated connectivity] methods have 
become staples of neural data analysis, and have revealed a great deal about the interactions 
between cortical and subcortical structures.” (Stevenson et al., 2008). We could simply have said 
that models that use other activities as independent variables are good predictors.  With LFPs it 
was argued that “[…] the relative weight of feedforward and lateral inputs in visual cortex is not 
fixed, but rather depends on stimulus contrast.” (Nauhaus et al., 2009). For EEG and MEG power 
coherence analyses, it was advocated that “[…] amplitude correlation is an informative index of 
the large-scale cortical interactions that mediate cognition.” (Siegel et al., 2012). For fMRI task 
data, other authors reported “[…] changes in the architecture of functional connectivity patterns 
that promote learning from initial training through mastery of a simple motor skill.” (Bassett et al., 
2015). For resting-state fMRI data, others claimed that FC may close the knowledge gap of “[…] 
the neuronal mechanisms that operate during and early after practice and during sleep to support 
motor memory consolidation.” (Dimyan and Cohen, 2011). However, all these approaches only 
reach level one in Pearl’s hierarchy of causation (Pearl and Mackenzie, 2018). While the 
impossibility of making causal statements in such situations is well known (Dawid, 2008; Holland, 
2015), the field regularly makes causal statements based on statistical analyses that cannot 
support such statements. Altogether, we conclude that this debate is not merely about semantics 
and second that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (Wittgenstein, 1922).  
 
We do not actually learn about causality from estimated connectivity 
Here we ask if the eC techniques used should be expected to estimate causal interactions. We 
ask if the techniques measure causality, connectivity, or flow, in the standard meanings of these 
words. We will conclude that, due to massive confounding, they merely describe the statistics of 
the joint neural data without convincing causal insights. 
It is important to first observe the way neurostatisticians describe their results, themselves. 
When entering the field, we ourselves stated “unobserved common input is a potential confound” 
(Stevenson et al., 2008). Daunizeau et al. stated that “the “missing region”” – i.e. 
underdetermination problem – presents “a potential deep methodological confound” (Daunizeau 
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et al., 2011). And Anil Seth, a pioneer of Granger Causality approaches to neuroscience explicitly 
states on Twitter “I am NOT saying that Granger Causality (GC) indicates causality in the 
colloquial sense of “if I did A then B would happen” (Seth, 2018).  These examples illustrate how 
statistics minded scientists tend to feature a paragraph that discusses how causality cannot be 
meaningfully estimated.  
A growing field in the domain of statistics and econometrics is concerned with causal 
discovery. They ask how observational data can be used to answer causal questions. There are 
multiple philosophies. Some base their studies on fitting modern techniques such as directed 
acyclic Bayesian graphs that represent a set of variables and their conditional dependencies 
(Pearl, 2009a). Others focus on matching approaches that can account retrospectively for 
randomization (Rubin, 2010). Importantly though, both have in common that they fail if there are 
important variables that are unmeasured and affect the variables of interest. The effect induced 
by other variables on the apparent statistical relation between variables of interest is called 
confounding. Within observational causal inference there is an understanding that there can be 
no solution if each pair of measured variables shares an unobserved confounder (Pearl, 2009b). 
A lot of the discussion in the field of functional connectivity is about statistics. And indeed, 
statistically estimating causal interactions is a hard problem (Spirtes and Zhang, 2016). Over time, 
advocates of functional connectivity research have introduced several statistical innovations, 
including sophisticated generative models for spiking (Havlicek et al., 2017; Paninski et al., 2008), 
priors about neuronal interactions (Calabrese et al., 2011; Stevenson et al., 2009), and priors 
about the network of interactions (Bassett et al., 2006). And, indeed, the statistics of network 
inference is complex, reflected by a progressively sophisticated field. However, we argue here 
that it is impossible to overcome the problem of massive confounding by using statistics.  
We want to dwell on the idea of confounders to functional connectivity. Let us say we are 
interested in the interactions between two neurons. Further, let us assume that there is a third 
neuron (confounder) that activates both neurons. In that case, if we see a correlation between the 
neurons we cannot know if it is due to the neurons interacting directly or through an induced 
interaction by the unobserved neuron. More generally, any joint distribution between two neurons 
could be induced by a single third neuron. Unobserved neurons or information can act as 
confounders for the inference of functional connectivity, threatening the validity of the results. This 
confounding problem is central to the statistical field of causal inference and it is generally 
acknowledged that, in typical situations, unobserved confounders render inferences about 
causality impossible. 
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We want to use the Simpson's paradox to highlight the threat of confounding (Simpson, 
1951), in which unobserved interaction can either cancel out main effects, or artificially induce 
spurious main effects. Let us say that there are two brain states (e.g. related to two levels of 
attention), and that one state is associated with high activity of neuron A and low activity of neuron 
B while another is associated with low activity of neuron A and high activity of neuron B. But let 
us say that there is a positive instantaneous causal influence from one on the other. If we do not 
know the brain state (confounded) we may conclude that neuron A has a negative influence on 
the activity of neuron B. But if we do know the brain state we correctly see that A increases the 
activity of neuron B (Figure 2). This paradox shows how confounders with relevant structure can 
arbitrarily influence the resulting functional connectivity.  
 Indeed, in certain neuroimaging datasets it is possible to directly observe the Simpson’s 
paradox. For instance, the choice of analysis parameters, such as seed regions, and the network 
they belong to, may mediate whether different FC methods 
yield similar, or orthogonal results (Roberts et al., 2016). This 
illustrates that results from FC analyses depend on a series 
of analysis and design decisions, rather than a true 
underlying, biologically meaningful statistical relationship. It 
seems that even the underlying brain architecture – 
interindividual differences in shape and location of 
neuroanatomical structures – can confound FC modeling 
results (Bijsterbosch et al., 2018). Datasets from fMRI and 
MEG are further affected by more obvious confounders 
including head motion and physiological processes such as 
the heartbeat and breathing (Driver et al., 2016; Messaritaki 
et al., 2017; Murphy et al., 2013) that add structured noise to 
the signal. In response, the field has developed some 
effective data correction techniques (Ciric et al., 2017; Murphy et al., 2013; Parkes et al., 2017; 
Power et al., 2014; R et al., 2018). However, for each such obvious external controllable 
confounder there are countless internal unobservable ones (DiDomenico and Eaton, 1988).   
 
Massive confounding destroys the causal interpretation of functional connectivity  
Our argument about the impossibility to obtain causality from functional connectivity does not 
come from data – there is too little ground truth about complex brains to make this possible (Jonas 
and Kording, 2017). It rests on a simple consideration of the factors that are known to make causal 
 
Figure 2: Simpson’s paradox. The 
yellow line indicates a negative correlation 
between activity of Neuron A and B, 
which is confounded by two different 
brain states. But within each state there is 
a positive correlation. This paradox shows 
that the sign of a correlation is not 
indicative of causality. 
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inference theoretically impossible. It rests on the justified assumption that we record only few of 
the neurons when recording spikes, or a few projections of neural activities in imaging. We have 
no convincing reasons to assume that the observed dimensions should be more important than 
the unobserved. Our argument thus boils down to a simple logical statement: if the bulk of causal 
interactions happen from and within unobserved dimensions, then the correlations between 
observed variables are simply epiphenomena. Correlation is not causation, regardless the 
mathematical sophistication we use when calculating it. Causal inference algorithms that work 
with observational data are generally built on the assumption of causal sufficiency, which boils 
down to there being no unobserved confounders (although see Ranganath and Perotte, 2018; 
Wang and Blei, 2018). Without these assumptions we can at best produce families of potential 
models and if any pair of recorded variables is confounded then this family will contain all models 
(Spirtes et al., 2001). Recording only few variables in a densely interacting causal system 
generally renders causal inference impossible (Jonas Peters et al., 2017; Pearl, 2009a). 
When analyzing spike data, there are far more unobserved variables than observed 
variables. When we record a few hundred neurons (Stevenson and Kording, 2011), the number 
of recorded neurons is a vanishingly small subset of all neurons. We have little reason to assume 
that the recorded neurons are much more important than the un-recorded neurons. As each 
neuron receives inputs from so many other un-recorded neurons, we should expect that the parts 
of neural activity driven by unobserved neurons are arbitrarily larger than the parts coming from 
observed neurons. In other words, the confounding signal should be many orders of magnitude 
more important than those coming from observed data. As such, we should not expect that causal 
inference is possible. 
When analyzing imaging data such as fMRI, or LFP, EEG, or MEG, there are also far more 
unobserved variables than observed variables. Within each signal source, we can, in some 
abstraction, observe the sum of neural activity. But the same measured activity can be realized 
by any combination of individual activities rendering a solution of the inverse problem (signals  
neuronal spike trains) infeasible. The activity of neurons which are orthogonal to our signal, can 
span arbitrary dimensions, related to movement, memory, thought or neuronal communication. 
Importantly, dense physiological recordings in small areas suggest that countless variables are 
represented (e.g. movement related signals in V1; Musall et al., 2018; Stringer et al., 2018). The 
signals that we can measure are arbitrarily low-dimensional relative to the full dimensionality of 
communication in the brain. As such we are still in the situation where we have a number of 
confounders that is many orders of magnitude larger than the number of measured variables. This 
again puts us into the domain where causal inference should be impossible. 
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 We might feel that causality may happen at a given scale, rendering the argument about 
unobserved dimensions invalid and allowing a multi-scale definition of interactions. The argument 
given is often the analogy to statistical physics: while understanding the interaction between gas 
molecules is hopeless, a large set of atoms can be well understood in terms of temperature and 
pressure. However, this analogy quickly breaks down. Every neuron is special, they do not 
interact with random neurons but with a largely fixed set. The justification of averaging over 
molecules is often perfectly fine in statistical physics. There is no evidence this logic would work 
in neuroscience. The separation of scales that sounds so meaningful outside of the brain makes 
little sense within. 
 As the impossibility of causal inference from subsampled data feels counter-intuitive we 
want to spell out the problem a bit more. Let us assume we are interested in the connections 
between two signals, e.g. voxels B and C. But the brain’s real dynamics is characterized by the 
activity of all neurons (xt). Let us assume, for simplicities sake, that dynamics are linear: 
xt=Axt-1+ noise         (1) 
where matrix A describes the true dynamic of the system.  The activities in our original voxels of 
interest, B and C (conveniently concatenated into a vector y which is actually observable) can be 
obtained using a projection matrix M that projects the activity of all neurons into a two-dimensional 
space:  
yt=Mxt.            (2) 
A neuroscientist may then want to use the time lagged correlation R=< yt yt-1t> in the measured 
signal y to gain insights into the properties of A. What will we measure then? We can now insert 
the definition of x and y and obtain  
R=MAVMt           (3)  
where V is the covariance matrix of x. The question now is what we can learn about A from R. 
We can obtain some intuition in special cases. If V was the identity matrix and hence all neurons 
would fire entirely independent of one another then R would reveal the average influence of brain 
area B on C, only that then the connections would have to all be zero. However, in reality, the 
autocorrelation function in every brain area (the local V) is known to have a broad spectrum of 
singular values. Moreover, V between brain areas will be nonzero. Here, confounding becomes 
obvious, elements of A that neither relate to signals A or B can in arbitrary ways affect the 
correlation V between the signals (see code in supplementary material for simulations). 
Importantly, if N is the number of neurons and K the number of measured signals (2 in the 
example) there is an  N 2 - K 2  manifold of A matrices that produce an identical correlation matrix. 
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As the number of neurons is typically much larger than the number of measured signals, the 
measurements do not really lower the dimensionality of the space of potential models (
 N 2 - K 2 » N 2 ). We note that while in this example we have computed a time-delayed correlation 
matrix as a metric of eC, also different methods (e.g. in Granger causality) essentially suffer from 
the same problem.  
 As the neural dimensionality (or speed of processing) in each measured signal increases, 
the temporal resolution decreases, the noise (or non-communication related signal) increases, 
the idea of extracting causality from observation becomes hopeless. Importantly, this is not a 
problem that can simply be solved by recording data from more subjects. This is a case where a 
problem can fundamentally not be solved. 
For all methods that we have at our disposal to run functional connectivity analyses, the 
signals are few relative to the many unobserved variables. In these settings, interactions between 
measured signals should describe much less variance than the interactions between unobserved 
variables. Just like in Simpson’s paradox, the interactions between such unobserved variables 
can arbitrarily affect the estimates of interactions between measured signals. In neuroscience we 
are essentially always in the massively confounded situation and then correlations as not 
informative about causality.  
 
Structure without causality 
The statistical fact that we should not expect algorithms to convert sparsely observed neural data 
to tell us about causality in the brain contrasts with the fact that FC findings often seem 
meaningful. We, for example, might often find correlations between early visual cortices to higher 
visual cortices (Buchel and Karl, 1997; Shmuel and Leopold, 2008) or between visual cortices 
and parietal involved in motor planning and execution (Miller and Vogt, 1984). So how can our 
functional connectivity results look so meaningful if they do not actually measure causal 
interactions? Timing is a confounder that readily produces structure and apparent causality. 
Following the organization of the visuomotor system, the primary visual cortex has the lowest 
latency, followed by higher level visual areas, premotor areas, and motor areas (Bullier, 2001). 
Importantly, most algorithms that utilize coherence or delays will effectively convert the 
order of activation into apparent causality. However, such timing may be entirely unrelated to 
causal interactions. It is sufficient, for example, if central planning activates each area at the time 
where it is relevant. Latency is being converted into an illusion of actual causality. Spatial blurring 
is also undeniably a factor. Nearby regions will naturally share some variance, both by artifacts of 
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the measurement techniques. As such, it is not surprising that nearby areas will often have FC. If 
FC merely reflects distance, then it provides no causal insights. Interestingly, corrections of 
functional connectivity for distance are rare and have been simple (Hagmann et al., 2008; Honey 
et al., 2009, 2007; Litvak et al., 2011). In some cases, spatial distance thus may be converted into 
an illusion of causality.  
Ultimately, there are any number of processes which affect correlations. Hence, any 
aspects of brain function may be reflected in the resulting correlations. Unfortunately, the 
inversion is impossible – we cannot meaningfully conclude about causal chains in a high-
dimensional system by observing the correlations between a (relatively) small number of 
observed variables. 
 
Testing causality 
So far, we have reviewed the logical evidence why FC from a small number of channels should, 
due to massive confounding, not be a suitable tool to reveal causal structure of brains that contain 
billions of neurons. However, in principle there may be aspects of brain activity that could rescue 
the idea. For example, if the brain’s activity was very low dimensional (Cunningham and Yu, 2014; 
Yu et al., 2009), then recording from a small number of voxels or neurons may be equivalent to 
recording all of them. But in this case, all the neurons that jointly define a dimension will confound 
the causal inference. Similarly, if we believe that the composition of the activity within a voxel 
does not matter but just the sum of the activities, and thus subscribe to a strong mean-field view 
(Cooper and Scofield, 1988; Gerstner et al., 2012), the statistical problems may be resolved. 
However, within each voxel, we find neurons of countless tuning properties (Hubel and Wiesel, 
1962). Alternatively, there may be something informative in the structure of neuronal signals that 
somehow makes this analysis possible. We may hope to gain some insight into the truth by 
analyzing the algorithm performance in situations where we know what to expect. 
If we should expect FC to meaningfully work then we should, above all, expect that it would 
work in simulated situations that lack many of the complexities characterizing the real world. And 
indeed, a recent study has systematically analyzed the quality of FC estimates based on the 
number of neurons that were not simulated. Removing as many as 20% of the neurons from the 
recordings let the reconstruction quality drop from 100% to 70% (with a chance level of 50%). 
Hence, FC measures can tolerate some proportion of missing neurons but only a small proportion 
(compare to nearly 100% for typical spike analysis; (Karbasi et al., 2018)). This simulation 
approach casts doubt on the usefulness of functional connectivity for estimating causality. 
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FC has been shown to be susceptible to the effect of temporal delays across modalities. 
Electrophysiological recordings show that connectivity estimates are highly susceptible to effects 
of temporal smoothing (Stevenson and Körding, 2010). fMRI simulations show that temporal 
down-sampling of neural activity alters connectivity estimates drastically (Barnett and Seth, 2017) 
such that estimates do not resemble reality when data is down-sampled to a rate typical for fMRI 
experiments (Handwerker et al., 2004).  Moreover, temporal delays of the hemodynamic response 
function (HRF), which varies between brain locations and subjects, may further confound results 
(Rangaprakash et al., 2018; Seth et al., 2013). This work shows that combinations of temporal 
smoothing and delays can massively distort functional connectivity estimates, casting doubt on 
the use of such techniques for estimating causality (Smith et al., 2011).  
 
A radical philosophical alternative 
Parts of the FC community, those using the term effective connectivity (EC) introduced a rather 
interesting philosophical alternative. In this view EC produces, or causes observed FC in a 
mathematical sense (Friston, 2011). As such they are causal given unverified, and arguably 
unlikely, assumptions, and methodologists thus do not explicitly claim that they are studying real 
connectivity. They merely compare different models and make statements about the preferable 
model in a given model class. Interestingly, DCM does derive from ideas of perturbations, it 
conceptualizes stimuli as perturbations (Friston et al., 2003). However, this strategy equally can 
not guard against the potential effects of confounding. The statements afforded by this approach 
are thus not about (biological) causality in the brain but about preference for a model from that 
model class (“All models are wrong, but some are useful”). Yet, once Dynamic Causal Modeling 
(DCM) is applied to brain signals, it is claimed that these models “estimate neurobiologically 
interpretable quantities such as the effective strength of synaptic connections among neuronal 
populations and their context-dependent modulation” (Stephan et al., 2010). Thus, DCM 
applications that implicitly aim to unravel neural mechanisms misinterpret causality in the model 
as biological causality in the same way as other eC techniques. We further note that expanding 
the model class can arbitrarily change the resulting causal conclusions. In other words, this 
approach does not afford statements about causal interactions within the brain. Rather, it risks 
falling for internally consistent statements about network dynamics that may be causal in a 
mathematical, but not in a biological sense (Etkin, 2018).   
 
The potential for correct “estimated connectivity” in the future 
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Algorithms claiming eC have been used exhaustively when analyzing brain data with the hope of 
getting at causality. Using a more accurate terminology could help in the interpretation and, clarify 
that our results remain foremost descriptive: Interregional, or interneural signal correlations 
captures what most techniques measure. After all, despite massive confounding, there seemed 
to be few alternatives. However, the situation is changing.  
It is possible to perturb the brain in many ways and thus to go beyond purely correlational 
experiments. To confidently get at causality requires perturbations to evaluate how a given input 
to the system modulates activities. Invasive brain stimulation techniques (e.g. optogenetics, 
intracortical electrical stimulation, and deep brain stimulation) and non-invasive brain stimulation 
techniques (e.g. transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial electrical stimulation) allow 
brain perturbations. Combined with classification of inter-regional correlations these approaches 
may yield biomarkers for treatment response (Drysdale et al., 2016;  but see also Dinga et al., 
2018). Perturbation techniques are currently, despite their limitations (Bestmann et al., 2015; 
Häusser, 2014; Sack and Linden, 2003; Siebner et al., 2009), as close as we can get to causality 
in neuroscience (Chen and Rothwell, 2012; Muldoon et al., 2016). However, we also note that 
inference about the inverse is more complex: lack of behavioral response after perturbing a 
certain area does not a imply that it is not causally but may be merely due to compensatory 
recruitment (Krakauer et al., 2017; O’Shea et al., 2007; Sack and Linden, 2003).   
Perturbation techniques such as bio-feedback training and brain computer interfaces 
(BCIs) may be seen as an approximation to direct (self-) control in humans (Arns et al., 2017; 
Chaudhary et al., 2016; Sitaram et al., 2017; Watanabe et al., 2017). These allow to entrain 
correlations between brain regions and test for desired behavioral changes (Ramot et al., 2017; 
Yamashita et al., 2017). Similarly, BCIs allow coupling neurons causally to outcomes and thus 
they may provide new tools for trying to understand causality within the brain (Golub et al., 2018; 
Sadtler et al., 2014). When working with randomized stimuli, BCI perturbation studies may allow 
to directly measure causal interactions between brain regions (Grosse-Wentrup et al., 2016). 
While these examples show that real-time entrainment of statistical dependencies in in 
neuroimaging shows promise, correction for confounds that are in principle correctable (e.g. 
spurious correlations due to head motion and physiological noise) still pose challenges (Maclaren 
et al., 2013; Misaki et al., 2015). Closed-loop optogenetic stimulation, where stimulation is 
triggered by learned neural activity patterns, has provided further means of studying causality 
invasively in animal models (Athalye et al., 2018). Optogenetic fMRI yields new possibilities to 
test for causal effective connectivity (Bernal-Casas et al., 2017), although temporal differences 
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for responses due to physiological and optogenetic stimulation (Albers et al., 2018) may impose 
limitations.  
Simulated perturbation experiments allow us to check if our assumptions are correct and 
what happens if they aren’t. Computational studies are an extension of thought experiments and 
have a long tradition in neuroscience (Gerstner et al., 2012; Lapicque, 1907). For example, we 
can evaluate the susceptibility to pitfalls of various common FC (Bastos and Schoffelen, 2016) 
and test how low signal-to-noise ratios affect false positive rates. Another pitfall of non-invasive 
electrophysiological studies (EEG/MEG) is volume conductance, which can lead to spurious FC 
estimates, and thus require sanity checks (Haufe et al., 2012). Simulation will help us to validate 
approaches, test the sensitivity of sanity checks and the effectiveness of potential remedies. 
For the analysis of some spiking systems there may be ways of sidestepping the 
confounding problem. If we have fast recordings and sparse connectivity patterns so that there is 
no time for the signal to travel sufficiently quickly from one neuron to another through any path 
but the most direct one, then the system effectively gets to be unconfounded. While this is not the 
typical setting, there may thus be ways of sidestepping it for certain subproblems (Bartho, 2004; 
English et al., 2017; Swadlow and Giisev, 2001; Swadlow and Gusev, 2002; Usrey et al., 2000). 
The intuition here is that if we record sufficiently fast, we see the direct and immediate effect of 
one neuron on another such that we can effectively use the timescale to de-confound estimates.   
It may also be possible that there is something about brain signals that, given the right 
analysis methods, makes it possible to approximately estimate causal interactions, say between 
brain regions. Maybe there are signals that are low dimensional and localized, maybe there are 
sparse localized events that result in signals that approximate external perturbations. Statistical 
techniques may be possible. For example, quasi-experimental techniques may allow meaningful 
causal estimates about brain connectivity (Lansdell and Kording, 2018; Lepperød et al., 2018). 
However, we cannot meaningfully use such techniques to learn about causality without having 
established that the strong extra assumptions we would need to make about the brain are justified 
and before having used simulations to check that under those assumptions the methods would 
actually work.  
For the obvious confounders the field is starting to use simulations to test basic 
assumptions of their techniques (Bastos and Schoffelen, 2016; Bright and Murphy, 2015; Haufe 
et al., 2013; Ramsey et al., 2010; Rangaprakash et al., 2018; Seth et al., 2013; Stokes and 
Purdon, 2018; Thompson et al., 2018). We propose that Interregional, or interneural signal 
correlations should be routinely checked for obvious signs of the Simpson’s paradox as has been 
suggested for other fields (Kievit et al., 2013; Rousselet and Pernet, 2012; Tu et al., 2008). 
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Because network analyses come with many degrees of freedom in data processing (Carp, 2012a, 
2012b), researchers should publish robustness checks, for instance by showing that results within 
the possible analysis space largely converge (Eippert et al., 2017; Karbasi et al., 2018), and 
ideally pre-register these pipelines (Allen and Mehler, 2018). Further, estimates of functional 
network can be validated against known structural network architecture or simulations (Lennartz 
et al., 2018; Schiefer et al., 2018). Taken together, thorough simulation checks within confounds 
that are observable can already flag problems. They thus help us to deal with rather trivial 
confounding problems that occur in FC, but also other areas of (neuro) science.  
The extensive confounding from only observing a small subset of neurons, however, 
seems hard to overcome without massive scale recording technologies or small brains. Many 
algorithms used for the inference of functional connectivity are quite meaningful when applied to 
systems that are exhaustively recorded. As such, it is an interesting question how well they work 
on small animals or engineered systems. For example, in the worm c. elegans, aplysia, or 
microprocessors (Jonas and Kording, 2017) recording all “neurons” at high temporal precision 
should be possible and in the larval zebrafish that may be possible soon (Ahrens et al., 2013). In 
systems where the complete circuitry is described, perturbation (e.g. pharmacological) studies 
can be used to test whether algorithms can reconstruct expected patterns (Gerhard et al., 2013). 
Such systems are much closer to the implied assumptions of the various causal inference 
techniques, mainly because they make the confounders observable. There would obviously still 
be confounding, e.g. from limited temporal resolution, making the causal inference problem quite 
hard. However, there are interesting approaches from econometrics, e.g. regression discontinuity 
designs and other pseudo experiments (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) that may be helpful 
(Marinescu et al., 2018). 
We have argued here, that eC approaches cannot meaningfully get at causality due to 
massive confounding, but it is important to point out that other branches of neuroscience and 
biology more generally have the same problem (Jonas and Kording, 2017). For instance, tuning 
curves, which describe how neurons are affected by a stimulus dimension such as color, do not 
reveal how they are computed. Lesions usually induce compensation making it hard to interpret 
their causality. Pharmacological interventions or stimulation studies typically perturb many 
neurons making it hard to assign the undeniable causal link to any specific neuronal path. 
However, the logical problems in other areas of neuroscience do not render a lack of logical 
precision in the FC field (more) acceptable. It is time for the field to take the reality of causal 
inference seriously (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Jonas Peters et al., 2017; Pearl, 2009a). 
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Understanding the joint statistics of neurons is still interesting 
We have reviewed why FC approaches cannot meaningfully get at causality due to massive 
confounding from unobserved variables. However, this circumstance does not imply that trying to 
understand the joint dynamics of many neurons or brain areas is not interesting. For example, 
looking at the brain in lower dimensional projections may allow us to see its invariances (Bruno 
et al., 2017; Gallego et al., 2017; Gordon et al., 2017). Interregional correlations may have no 
causal meaning, but they may allow us to derive biomarkers (Drysdale et al., 2016; Faiman et al., 
2018; Medaglia et al., 2017; Muldoon et al., 2018). Informative markers may even be derived from 
brain-body correlations (Rebollo et al., 2018; Valenza et al., 2016). In fact, there are many 
biologically meaningful questions (Gomez-Marin, 2017; Krakauer et al., 2017) – and insights 
about brains can come from answering any of them. It is just important to be clear about the 
statements permitted by any one approach – statements about joint statistics are not meaningful 
statements about causality. 
Along with these considerations comes an important set of insights into the sociology of 
neuroscience. The current publication system almost forces authors to make causal statements 
using filler verbs (e.g. to drive, alter, promote) as a form of storytelling (Gomez-Marin, 2017); 
without such a statement they are often accused of just collecting meaningless facts. In the light 
of our discussion this is a major mistake, which incites the field to misrepresent its findings. 
Understanding the structure of brain data is interesting in its own right. Scientists who actually 
measure causality using carefully designed perturbations should be lauded for the hard work. At 
the same time, scientists who describe joint statistics should be rewarded for careful 
characterizations. We do learn about the brain by analyzing joint distributions. We simply should 
not claim causality. 
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Appendix 
We provide some simple code here that may be the basis of exploring the various effects 
in which large partially observable systems are hard to reverse engineer. We explicitly do 
not use any specific estimated connectivity technique as any such choice would seem 
arbitrary. All code and data used in Figure 1 also available on: https://osf.io/9cs8p/ 
 
%% Define a brain 
nNeurons=100; 
pConnect=.1; 
A=rand(nNeurons)<pConnect; 
A=double(A); 
%A=A+diag(ones(1,nNeurons)); 
%consider neurons with self history. 
%A=A+100*diag(ones(nNeurons,1)); 
A=sparse(A); 
s=svds(A,2); 
A=A/s(1)/1.01; % set the longest time constant to be 100. 
imagesc(A) 
  
%% Simulate it 
nTimes=2000; 
noiseLevel=1; 
x=zeros(nNeurons,nTimes); 
x(:,1)=noiseLevel*randn(nNeurons,1); 
for i=2:nTimes 
    x(:,i)=A*x(:,i-1)+noiseLevel*randn(nNeurons,1); 
end 
imagesc(x); 
   
%% relate correlations to generator 
subplot(2,1,1) 
R=corrcoef([x(:,1:end-1);x(:,2:end)]'); 
Rdelayed=R(1:nNeurons,nNeurons+1:2*nNeurons); 
imagesc(Rdelayed) 
subplot(2,1,2) 
Adisp=A'; 
imagesc(Adisp) 
j=corrcoef(Rdelayed(:),Adisp(:)) 
  
%% relate correlations between areas to generator 
nRegions=10; %must evenly divide nNeurons, e.g. 10 of 300 
B=zeros(nNeurons,nRegions); 
for i=1:nRegions 
    B((1:nNeurons/nRegions)+(i-1)*nNeurons/nRegions,i)=1; 
end 
     
% Now get the activity 
y=B'*x; 
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subplot(2,1,1) 
Ry=corrcoef([y(:,1:end-1);y(:,2:end)]'); 
RyDelayed=Ry(1:nRegions,nRegions+1:2*nRegions); 
imagesc(RyDelayed) 
subplot(2,1,2) 
Adisp=(B'*A*B)'; 
imagesc(Adisp) 
j=corrcoef(RyDelayed(:),Adisp(:)) 
 
 
